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Introduction
Dating back to former U.S. president George Bush’s admin-
istration, the United States has provided Colombia with hun-
dreds of millions of dollars in counter-narcotics assistance,
given primarily to elite counter-drug units of the Colombian
National Police. In 2000, however, the United States precipitously
increased its support for Colombia’s armed forces by providing
massive aid for the military—ostensibly to fight the decades-old
“War on Drugs.” The factors contributing to this rapid shift from
police aid to military aid are numerous: an election year in the
United States, the public relations efforts of a savvy Colombian
president and his able advisors, fears of growing guerrilla mil-
itary strength and resulting regional instability, exploding coca
cultivation, and Colombia’s continued strategic and economic
importance to the United States.
Given, however, the Colombian military’s current intransi-
gence in improving its own human rights performance and
that of allied paramilitary groups, U.S. military aid is the wrong
signal at the wrong time. In addition to being wholly ineffectual
in achieving its stated objective of reducing drug production in
Colombia, this aid is likely to propel an already grave situation
into a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe.
A Brief Overview of the Participants in Colombia’s Armed Conflict
The Colombian armed conflict is characterized by a universal
disregard for basic concepts of international humanitarian law
pertaining to internal conflicts, as defined by Common Article
3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocol
II of 1977. For every armed combatant killed as a result of the
conflict, at least two unarmed civilians also are killed. Amnesty
International believes that roughly 3,500 politically-motivated
murders took place in 1999 alone. 
The country’s armed opposition groups—the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation
Army (ELN)—are primarily responsible for these gross infrac-
tions of international humanitarian law. According to the inter-
nationally-respected Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ),
these groups collectively were responsible for an estimated 19.6
percent of all political killings carried out in 1999. These groups
also have used abductions, selective killings of unarmed civilians,
and the forced recruitment of minors to achieve their ends. 
In addition to the armed opposition groups, the Colom-
bian armed forces—the army, in particular—have a long history
of violating human rights and international humanitarian law
in the context of social repression and counter-insurgency
operations. Although these violations manifested themselves in
the 1970s and into the early 80s in the forms of political deten-
tions and torture, the late 80s and early 90s saw a marked shift
toward selective killings, disappearances, and massacres. Over
this same period, right-wing irregular forces, the self-styled
“peasant self-defense forces” or paramilitary groups, began
their rise toward infamy. Following a string of massacres, then-
president Virgilio Barco outlawed paramilitary groups in July of
1989 with Decree 1149. These groups, however, continued to
operate in the 1990s and have expanded rapidly in recent years.
In order to carry out their “dirty war” counter-insurgency cam-
paigns while trying to improve their international human rights
image, the Colombian military forces have effectively acted
through their paramilitary allies. One symptom of this phe-
nomenon has been the drop in political killings by the armed
forces and the commensurate rise in paramilitary massacres.
Though emphatically denied by the Colombian State, Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, the United Nations, and
scores of Colombian human rights non-governmental organi-
zations have overwhelmingly documented the strong links
between the armed forces and paramilitary groups. Public pro-
nouncements aside, there have been few concrete demonstra-
tions of the political will to dismantle paramilitary groups. The
Colombian government offers statistics about incarcerated para-
military members to prove its efforts at controlling these groups,
but have little in the way of specific evidence. Many known
paramilitary leaders—the intellectual authors of hundreds of
killings—such as Carlos Castaño, Ramón Isaza, and Julian
Duque, operate openly and without effective prosecution.
The on-going links between the paramilitary and the govern-
ment armed forces appear evident in dozens, if not hundreds, of
cases each year. One notorious example is the case of El Salado,
located near the Caribbean coast in the department of Bolívar.
From February 18-20, 2000, approximately 300 paramilitary mem-
bers massacred at least 46 unarmed townspeople. Those persons
killed include a six-year-old girl and an elderly woman, as reported
in the Data Bank of Human Rights and Political Violence, a joint
project of two respected Colombian human rights NGOs. Over the
course of the three days, the regional military ignored pleas by the
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U.S. Military Support for Plan
Colombia: Adding Fuel to the Fire
by Andrew Miller*
The Controversy Over Plan Colombia
In 1999, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana
launched his blueprint for foreign assistance: the
U.S.$7.5 billion “Plan Colombia.” In response, U.S.
Senator Paul Coverdell (R-GA) sponsored the Alliance
with Colombia and the Andean Region (ALIANZA)
Act of 1999 (S. 1758). Although time ran out in the
1999 legislative calendar, Congress was quick to return
to the issue in early 2000. In the House of Represen-
tatives, support for Plan Colombia appeared in the
emergency supplemental appropriations bill, H.R.
3908, which was passed in late March and included
U.S.$1.7 billion for Colombia. Senate funds were
approved in June as part of the regular appropriations
process and appeared in S. 2522. On July 13, 2000,
President Bill Clinton signed Public Law 106-246,
which included U.S.$1.319 billion in aid to Colombia
and other Andean countries for Fiscal Years (FYs)
2000 and 2001.
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townspeople to intervene and instead, set up a roadblock and pre-
vented humanitarian workers from entering the area, effectively
assisting the paramilitary activity. Yet Admiral William Porra,
second-in-command of the Colombian Navy, continues to claim
that the deaths were a result of combat.
United States Support for Plan Colombia
In the last ten years, the United States has been funding the
Colombian security forces as part of the U.S. “War on Drugs.”
Levels of official funding, however, have varied greatly. In the
early 1990s, security assistance began to significantly diminish.
This decrease was due to the Congressional “de-certification” of
then-president Ernesto Samper’s administration for non-
cooperation in the anti-drug effort. Congressional concern for
the Colombian military’s abysmal human rights record also
played a role in the decline of aid. Starting in 1996, however,
figures for aid to the Colombian security forces began to rise.
The United States sidestepped the issue of the military’s human
rights record by giving the counter-narcotics aid to the Colom-
bian National Police instead, which was lead by General Rosso
José Serrano. Both Colombia and the United States viewed
General Serrano as a hero for his successes in firing thousands
of corrupt police officers and for dismantling the Cali Cartel,
the infamous cocaine cartel in Colombia, which, according to
CNN, was once the world’s largest cocaine supplier, generating
U.S.$8 billion per year in cocaine sales.
In 1999, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana launched a
new blueprint for attracting massive foreign assistance: the
U.S.$7.5 billion “Plan Colombia.” The Plan is said to address five
different areas of need: support for Colombia’s peace process,
fighting drugs, economic relief, strengthening the judicial struc-
ture and human rights, and social development of the country.
Pastrana’s plan called for U.S. assistance in counter-narcotics
and, consequently, military hardware and training.
On July 13, 2000, President Bill Clinton signed Public Law
106-246, which included U.S.$1.319 billion in aid to Colombia
and other Andean countries for FYs 2000 and 2001. Of the
total U.S.$1.319 billion in emergency counter-narcotics aid,
$860 million is destined for Colombia. This sum is divided into
a number of categories: military assistance ($519.2 million),
police assistance ($123.1 million), alternative development
($68.5 million), human rights ($51 million), law enforcement
and rule of law ($45 million), aid to the internally displaced
($37.5 million), judicial reform ($13 million), and peace ($3 mil-
lion).
Public Law 106-246 states, however, that the United States will
not begin to distribute this aid until the U.S. State Department
certifies that the Colombian government has complied with the
following human rights conditions: the Colombian president
must direct in writing that Colombian armed forces personnel
credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human
rights or to have aided or abetted paramilitary groups will be
brought to justice in civilian courts (Section 3201(1)(A)(i));
the Commander General of the armed forces must promptly
suspend from duty any personnel credibly alleged to have com-
mitted gross violations of human rights or to have aided or
abetted paramilitary groups (Section 3201(a)(1)(A)(ii)); the
Colombian armed forces must comply fully with (A)(i) and (ii)
(Section 3201(a)(1)(A)(iii)); the Colombian armed forces must
cooperate fully with civilian authorities in any such investigations,
prosecutions, and punishments (Section 3201 (a)(1)(B)); the
Government of Colombia must vigorously prosecute, in civilian
courts, paramilitary group members as well as any Colombian
armed forces personnel who aid or abet paramilitary groups
(Section 3201(a)(1)(C)); and the Colombian Armed Forces
must develop and deploy a Judge Advocate General Corps to
investigate armed forces personnel for misconduct (Section
3201(a)(1)(E)).
Although Public Law 106-246 conditioned U.S. aid to Colom-
bia on Colombia’s obligation to meet key human rights conditions,
the law also included a presidential waiver that the U.S. President
could invoke on the vague grounds of national security, such as
preserving democracy in Colombia, promoting US interests in eco-
nomic reform, and protecting US citizens and hemispheric sta-
bility. From August 17–18, the U.S. State Department hosted an
NGO consultation in Bogotá and in Washington, D.C. to solicit
outside input on Colombia’s human rights performance. In a joint
document, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the
Washington Office on Latin America presented a detailed analy-
sis of the conditions and concluded that the United states should
not certify these conditions because they have not been met.
On August 22, 2000, President Clinton certified that Colom-
bia had complied with one condition (Section 3201(1)(A)(i)).
Human rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International, however, reject the President’s certifica-
tion of this provision. Furthermore, also at the protest of human
rights organizations, President Clinton waived the remaining con-
ditions set forth in the legislation, claiming that the Colombians
did not have sufficient time to make the requisite progress. On
August 23, 2000, President Clinton justified this waiver by stating
that “[the United States] has protected [its] fundamental inter-
est in human rights and enabled the Plan Colombia to have a
chance to succeed, which I think is very, very important for the long-
term stability of democracy and human rights in Colombia and
for protecting the American people and the Colombian people
from drug traffic.” This certification process covered funds allo-
cated in FY 2000 and will be repeated later this year before FY 2001
funds can be sent. It is likely that President Clinton will again waive
most of the conditions, as they will not have been met.
continued on next page
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By waiving the human rights conditions of Public Law 106-
246, and allowing for the flow of military assistance into Colom-
bia, the United States sends the message that human rights
considerations are not a priority and that the Colombian gov-
ernment need only make a superficial effort to address these
issues in order to secure future aid. The Colombian authorities,
both civilian and military, have mastered the art of such super-
ficial efforts. They have established what is perhaps the most
extensive human rights bureaucracy in the world. They have
passed extensive human rights legislation, including recent
approval of the long-awaited Forced Disappearance Law of
2000 (Ley 589 de 2000, Ley de Desaparición Forzada). They have
even fired several generals implicated in working with para-
military groups to commit human rights violations. These
efforts, however, have not amounted to much because the
Colombian authorities have demonstrated an aversion to imple-
menting concrete measures necessary to end impunity, despite
regular recommendations to do so by such bodies as the United
Nations and the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights.
Recommendations for Improving Human Rights in Colombia
How the Colombian State should go about improving human
rights is an unambiguous and well-understood process. The
following are some specific examples of what Colombia could
do to demonstrate it has the political will to improve its human
rights situation. First, the Colombian government should hold
high-ranking (Colonel and General levels) Colombian military
officers, paramilitaries, and armed opposition leaders account-
able by immediately suspending them after credible allega-
tions of their involvement in human rights violations or col-
laboration with paramilitary organizations, subjecting them to
a full and impartial investigation by civilian authorities, promptly
and transparently trying them in civilian courts, and sentencing
them commensurate with the severity of their crimes. Second,
the Colombian government should dismantle known paramil-
itary bases, such as Finca “Villa Sandra,” located three kilome-
ters outside of Puerto Asís, Putumayo. Third, the Colombian gov-
ernment should carry out all human rights investigations and
trials under civilian jurisdiction, with the full cooperation of the
security forces. Fourth, the Colombian government could pro-
tect human rights defenders and others at risk by ending
impunity for human rights violations.
U.S. aid to the Colombian military will only contribute to the
drug trafficking in Colombia because this aid will trickle down
to the paramilitaries, who are heavily involved in the drug
trade. The paramilitaries have continued to target coca grow-
ing regions, such as the Serrania de San Lucas in the southern
part of the Bolívar department, the La Gabarra region of North
Santander department, and the Putumayo department—the
epicenter of the U.S. military aid’s effort—in their territorial
expansion over the last several years. These offensives have
served the dual role of weakening the guerrillas both militarily
and politically, while shifting control of coca profits from the
guerrillas to the paramilitaries. It is easy to imagine a Plan
Colombia-facilitated diminution of guerrilla control of these coca
regions, with the simple result of a strengthened paramilitary
control of the coca, therefore not solving the drug problem.
Essentially, this would represent the worst of both worlds: main-
taining the drug production while strengthening the paramil-
itaries, who will continue to carry out widespread human rights
violations with the impunity that they have always enjoyed.
Conclusion
The Colombian and United States governments have pub-
licly recognized the fundamental role that respect for human
rights must play in solving the Colombian crisis. For too long,
however, they have disregarded human rights in practice for the
exigencies of fighting the civil conflict and narrow political
and economic interests. It is time to move beyond those words
and turn their expressed commitments into concrete actions.
Until real indicators of the political will to make difficult deci-
sions appear, human rights advocates will continue to strongly
oppose support to the Colombian armed forces. 
*Andrew Miller is acting Advocacy Director for Latin America and the
Caribbean at Amnesty International USA (AI).  From March 1999
through February 2000, he served as a human rights observer in the
northwestern Colombian region of Urabá with Peace Brigades Inter-
national (PBI).  The views expressed here are not necessarily those of
AI or PBI. 
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